Every speech, statement, minute, and press-conference transcript from the seven Board governors and twelve regional bank presidents — scored for hawkish or dovish tone against a fixed rubric, refreshed weekday evenings.
Each meeting collapses to one combined score: the prepared statement averaged with Powell's same-day press conference. Drift is what the Q&A added on top of the text. Δ vs prior compares this meeting's combined score to the previous meeting's.
Intraday moves around each FOMC meeting. ES and NQ as price % change with annualized realized vol; ZT as approximate 2y yield Δ in basis points (positive bp = hawkish, derived via duration ≈ 2.0).
| Meeting | Statement window 14:00→14:30 ET |
Same-day close 14:30→16:00 ET |
Next-day close → next 16:00 ET |
||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S&P (ES) | Nasdaq (NQ) | 2y yield (Δbp) | S&P (ES) | Nasdaq (NQ) | 2y yield (Δbp) | S&P (ES) | Nasdaq (NQ) | 2y yield (Δbp) | |
| 2026-04-29 | −0.19% | −0.15% | +1.9 bp | +0.34% | +0.47% | +0.6 bp | +1.29% | +1.35% | −3.4 bp |
| 2026-03-18 | −0.10% | −0.10% | −1.3 bp | −0.69% | −0.82% | +7.5 bp | −0.97% | −1.13% | +9.4 bp |
| 2026-01-28 | — | — | — | — | — | — | −0.16% | −0.64% | −1.7 bp |
| 2025-12-10 | — | — | — | — | — | — | +0.16% | −0.42% | −3.6 bp |
The fed funds futures curve, broken into per-meeting probabilities via step-path / FedWatch math. Compared against the latest combined Fed-speak score to surface gaps. as of 2026-06-08.
| Meeting | Implied rate after | Δ at meeting | Cut 100 bp | Cut 75 bp | Cut 50 bp | Cut 25 bp | Hold | Hike 25 bp | Hike 50 bp | Hike 75 bp | Hike 100 bp |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-17 | 3.580% | -8.0 bp | 0% | 0% | 0% | 32% | 68% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 2026-07-29 | 4.048% | +46.9 bp | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 12% | 88% | 0% | 0% |
| 2026-09-16 | 3.750% | +9.0 bp | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 64% | 36% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 2026-10-28 | 3.789% | +3.9 bp | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 85% | 15% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 2026-12-09 | 3.906% | +10.1 bp | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 60% | 40% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 2027-01-27 | 3.961% | +5.5 bp | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 78% | 22% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 2027-03-17 | 4.032% | +7.2 bp | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 71% | 29% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 2027-04-28 | 4.059% | +2.7 bp | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 89% | 11% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
Each speaker's trailing 90-day mean places them in a camp. Widening spreads historically precede dissents at the next FOMC meeting.
Seven Federal Reserve Board governors and twelve regional bank presidents. Each card shows the speaker's 90-day mean and a sparkline of their last thirty speech scores (oldest → newest, on the −2…+2 scale).
Each entry shows the score, a one-sentence rationale extracted from the rubric pass, and the source link.
Logan explicitly signals that higher interest rates may be necessary, stating she is 'increasingly concerned that higher interest rates could be necessary later this year to fully restore price…
Hammack explicitly signals that rates may need to rise, stating that 'if recent trends continue, it may soon be appropriate to act' and expressing concern that 'monetary policy may not be…
Bowman describes a moderately restrictive current stance she views as appropriate while looking through temporary energy/tariff inflation, and she explicitly dissented in July 2025 in favor of an…
Schmid explicitly states his 'primary concern is inflation, which is too hot and has been above target for too long,' dismisses the transitory narrative, and says his focus remains on inflation in…
Musalem explicitly argues against easing policy based on hoped-for productivity gains, emphasizing that inflation is 'meaningfully above target,' longer-term inflation expectations are 'drifting…
Cook explicitly states that risks 'remain tilted toward higher inflation' and that she is 'prepared to raise rates' if disinflation does not materialize in a timely manner. While she acknowledges…
Jefferson presents a balanced assessment with modest hawkish tilts: he notes inflation risks are 'tilted to the upside,' that disinflation stalled due to tariffs, and that inflation has moved…
Waller explicitly supports removing the 'easing bias' language from the policy statement and pausing rate cuts, citing rising inflation well above target (PCE ~3.8%) and broad price pressures. While…
Barkin explicitly defends holding rates steady as appropriate given uncertainty about the supply shock's duration, while laying out risks to both sides of the dual mandate (employment softening and…
Paulson describes policy as 'mildly restrictive' and appropriate, explicitly stating that rate cuts would 'only become appropriate once we have seen sustained progress on inflation,' while…
Collins emphasizes that inflation has been above target for over five years and explicitly states she has reduced patience for 'looking through' supply shocks, signaling a bias toward maintaining or…
Goolsbee's speech is primarily analytical, exploring how anticipated vs. unexpected productivity growth affects the appropriate policy rate. However, the prescriptive conclusion leans hawkish: since…
Williams presents a balanced dual-mandate framing, noting elevated inflation (3.5% PCE) alongside mixed labor market signals, and explicitly states 'the current stance of monetary policy is well…
Kashkari dissented because he wanted to remove forward guidance implying the next move is a cut, arguing the FOMC should signal equal probability of a hike or cut given inflation risks from the…
Waller signals caution about rate cuts in the near term, noting that underlying inflation is still above 2% and that sequential price shocks (tariffs, then energy) risk embedding higher inflation…
Williams presents a balanced assessment of both sides of the dual mandate, noting mixed labor market signals alongside inflation crosscurrents, and explicitly states 'the current stance of monetary…
Jefferson describes a balanced dual-mandate risk environment—downside risk to employment and upside risk to inflation—and explicitly supports holding rates steady at current levels, which he…
Musalem expresses a preference for holding rates steady 'for some time,' describes the real policy rate as 'in the lower portion of the neutral range' (implying limited room to ease), and emphasizes…
Schmid explicitly states he is 'more focused on the risks to inflation at this time' and argues against looking through the energy price shock, emphasizing that inflation has run above target for…
Williams describes a broadly balanced economic picture with solid growth, a stable labor market, and elevated inflation partly driven by tariffs and energy prices. He characterizes current policy as…
Barkin explicitly frames risks as balanced — both labor market fragility and inflation stalling — and describes the decision to hold rates as prudent given the foggy outlook. He neither signals a…
Paulson emphasizes that inflation remaining above 2% (currently 2.8%) for six years means the Fed has less room to be patient than during the Greenspan era, and she explicitly states she would…
Jefferson explicitly frames the outlook as balanced between downside labor market risk and upside inflation risk, and endorses holding rates steady as 'well positioned to respond to a range of…
Barr explicitly supports holding policy steady while emphasizing inflation persistence risks, elevated core inflation (~3%), rising near-term inflation expectations, and the danger that repeated…
The speech advocates for reducing the Fed's balance sheet, which is a tightening of financial conditions, and explicitly acknowledges its 'contractionary effects for the economy.' While Miran frames…
The speech is predominantly about community development and CRA, but Barr briefly addresses monetary policy, stating he supported holding rates steady and believes 'we may need to keep rates steady…
Collins explicitly favors maintaining 'policy rates at their current, mildly restrictive levels for some time,' citing continued upside inflation risks and no urgency for additional policy…
Williams characterizes monetary policy as 'currently well positioned' and sees tariff effects as temporary and one-off, with inflation expected to return to 2% by 2027. His forward guidance…
Schmid consistently emphasizes that inflation remains too high at near 3%, warns against complacency, and stresses the risks of inflation becoming entrenched. His framing that 'inflation remains too…
Waller dissented in January in favor of a cut and frames the current situation as balanced between holding and cutting, with explicit readiness to cut in March if February labor data disappoints. His…
Each document is scored by Claude Sonnet 4.6 against a fixed rubric. The rubric stays cached across scans; the only thing that changes is the doc-type header on the user message — speech vs statement vs minutes vs press-conference transcript.
Per-speaker RSS feeds for governors; per-bank scrapers (RSS, server-rendered HTML, or headless Chromium) for the twelve regional presidents. FOMC docs from the consolidated press feed.
A −2 (very dovish) to +2 (very hawkish) scale. Prompt caching keeps the rubric warm; doc-type header switches per file.
For each new FOMC statement, a separate Claude pass produces 3–5 bullet diff notes against the previous statement, naming the specific wording shifts that matter.
Speeches alert when |score − 90-day mean| ≥ 1.0 or |z| ≥ 1.5. FOMC docs alert at |Δ vs prior| ≥ 0.5. Email digest is dispatched only when something fires.
An open ledger of pipeline gaps and exclusions. Every speaker's mean is computed only from items that DO have a score; this section lists the rest.
Speakers whose latest stored speech is more than 60 days old. Could mean a scraper broke or just that the speaker hasn't posted a transcript-archived speech (TV/podcast appearances are intentionally excluded).
What the pipeline saw but excluded. Each speaker's hawk/dove mean is computed only from items that DO have a score, so it's worth knowing what was deliberately left out.
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